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ADMIRALTY-SuITS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES-PLACE OF SurT,-The plain-
tiff brought a libel in personam against the United States under the provisions of
the Suits in Admiralty Act, Act of March 9, 192o (41 Stat at L. 525) to prose-
cute a claim previously enforceable only in rem. Held, that the action could be
brought in any district where an action in personam could be brought. Alsberg
v. United States (1922, S. D. N. Y.) 285 Fed. 573.
Historically the necessity of securing jurisdiction of the ship to assure satis-
faction of the judgment led to the development of the libel in ren. I Select
Pleas in, the Court of Admiralty (1894, 6 Seld. Soc.) lxxii. In this country,
suits in rev; against government vessels were allowed by the Shipping Act, Act
of September 7, 1916 (39 Stat. at L. 728) ; The Lake Monroe (1919) 250 U. S.
246, 39 Sup. Ct. 460. But the arrest of government vessels hampered their sale
by the Shipping Board and led to the passage of the Suits in Admiralty Act,
supra, prohibiting such arrest, and providing for suits against the United States
with a means of satisfying judgments. See (1920) 59 CONG. REc. 168o, I685,
3630; The Caddo (1922, S. D. N. Y.) 285 Fed. 643, 644. Under this act it has
been held that the action in rem still exists, only the liability of the government
is substituted for the so-called liability of the vessel. The Isonomia (1922, C.
C. A. 2d) 285 Fed. 516; Gray Harbor Co. v. United States (1923, W. D. Wash.)
286 Fed. 444. But such language is open to the objection that the suit and judg-
ment against the government unlike those in rem are wholly without effect on
any proprietary interest in the vessel. See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Concep-
tions (1923) io8, 1O9. And the statute gives the judgment creditor no rights to
the proceeds of the sale of the vessel, nor to any specific money of the govern-
ment. Thus an analysis of this statutory libel shows that the judgment, the action,
and the proceedings are essentially in personam. See Cook, Powers of Courts
of Equity: I "In Rein" and "In Personam." (I915) 15 COL. L. REv. 37. There
is some practical convenience in having the trial in the district where the ship
is found, as the evidence is likely to be close at hand and the witnesses are
available. But it is equally desirable that the plaintiff be able to sue at his
residence. Furthermore, the doctrine of the immunity of the government from
suit for its civil wrongs arising from the conduct of business, already the object
of much sound criticism, should not be extended. Bank of United States v.
Planters' Bank (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 9o4; Laski, The Responsibility of the
State in England (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 447; Weston, Actions against the.
Property of Sovereigns (1919) 32 ibid. 266, 269; NOTES (1922) 70 U. PA. L.
REv. 322, 326. The decision of the instant case adopting all the incidents of the
action in personam, including venue, is a desirable interpretation of the statute.
Lord, Admiralty Claims Against the Government (1919) 19 COL. L. RIv. 467;
COMMENTS (1923) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 879.
ADVERSE PossEssio-CoNsBuc=v ADVERS E POSSESSION OF TRACTS SEPAR-
ATELY DESCRIBED IN A VoI DEED.-Claiming under a void deed, which purported
to convey several separately described tracts of land, the plaintiff occupied one of
such tracts for the statutory period. He sued to recover another tract which he
did not occupy. Held, that he could not recover. Georgia Minerals Co. v. Cox
(1923, Ga.) 115 S. E. 770.
Adverse occupation of part of a tract claimed under color of title generally
is equivalent to possession of the whole tract. Jones v. Pond & Decker M'fg.
Co. (i9o6) 79 Ark. 194, 96 S. W. 756. This rule has been made statutory in some
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jurisdictions. Herbst v. Merrifield (1896) 133 Mo. 267, 34 S. W. 571 ; Scaife v.
Western North Carolina Land Co. (1898, C. C. A. 4th) go Fed. 238; see Barber
v. Shaffer (i886) 76 Ga. 285. But adverse possession of one of several non-
contiguous tracts separately described in an invalid deed of conveyance will
not be effective as to the others. Stephenson v. Doe' (1847, Ind.) 8 Blackf. 5o8;
Dow v. Dow (1923, Mass.) 137 N. E. 746. The same is true even though the
tracts are contiguous, if separately described in a deed. Loftin v. Cobb (854)
46 N. C. 4o6; Hornblower v. Banton (1907) 03' Me. 375, 69 Atl. 568; contra:
Parsons v. Dills (1914) i59 Ky. 471, 167 S. W. 415; Brougher v. Stone (1895)
72 Miss. 647, 17 So. 5o9; cf. Overton v. Perry (19o8) 129 Ky. 415, 111 S. W. 369.
But where the invalid instrument purports to convey a single body of land, and
describes it as composed of several lots or parcels, actual occupation of a single
lot is effective as to all. Johnson v. Stinerly (i892) 90 Ga. 612, I6 S. E. 951;
Webb v. Richardson (i869) 42 Vt. 465. This fiction of constructive adverse
possession is based on the idea that the paper title is evidence of the extent of
the claim made by the actual occupancy. It seems reasonable, however, to limit
the application of the rule to cases where the actual occupation is not only under
color of title, but also notorious, as regards all of the land. See (I909) 23 H. v.
L. Rav. 56.
AmENS-CITIZENSHIP--WoMAN'S MAMIAGt To ALzN.-An unmarried female
alien, who was ordered deported as a feeble-minded person, was allowed, under
bond, to land for six months to visit relatives. Within that period she was
married in good faith to a citizen of the United States. Her mental condition
remained unchanged, and her deportation was ordered. A petition was filed for
a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that she had acquired American citizenship and
thus was not subject to deportation under the immigration laws. United States,
ex rel. Sejneusky, v. Tod (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 285 Fed. 523.
At common law, marriage had no effect on the nationality of a woman. I
Piggott, Nationality (1907) 57; Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens
Abroad (1915) 593. But a woman married to a citizen of the United States was
deemed to be a citizen by statute. Act of Feb. 10, 1855 (IO Stat. at L. 604) ;
U. S. Rev. Sts. 1878, sec. 1994; U. S. Comp. Sts. I916, sec. 3948. As the statute
was construed after i9IO, she could no longer be excluded under the immigration
laws. Hopkins v. Fachant (I9o4, C. C. A. 9th) 130,Fed. 839; In re Nicola
(i9II, C. C. A. 2d) 184 Fed. 322; contra: Ex parte Kaprielian (I9io, D. Mass.)
188 Fed. 694. Before September 22, 1922, the status of the wife followed that of
her husband, and any American woman who married a foreigner thereby took
his nationality. Act of Mar. 2, 1907 (34 Stat at L. 1228). Mackenzie v. Hare
(915) 239 U. S. 299, 36 Sup. Ct. xo6; Borchard, op. cit. 598, 685. The instant
case is then unquestionably sound. The national status of a married woman
was, however, changed by the Act of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021)
providing that she shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of
marriage; nor cease to be a citizen thereby, unless she marries an alien ineligible
to citizenship. As to expatriation, this seems to be a reversion to her status'
prior to the Act of i9o7, when she lost her nationality only by marrying and
removing with an alien to his country. Shanks v. Dupont (830, U. S.) 3 Pet.
242; Comitis v. Parkerson (1893, E. D. La.) 56 Fed. 556; Ruckgaber v. Moore
(I9OO, E. D. N. Y.) 104 Fed. 947. But while, under the Act of 1907, an Ameri-
can woman regained her citizenship through her husband's naturalization, under
the present act it seems that she may be regarded as an alien, while her foreign
born husband possesses the privileges of citizenship. The present Act leaves
unremedied the possibility of statelessness of an American woman who follows
her husband, where, as in Brazil, his country does not confer his nationality
upon her; and creates the possibility of a similar result for the alien woman
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who comes here to marry an American, where by the law of her country she is
thus expatriated. For a criticism of the present Act before its passage, see
Flournoy, Naturalization and Expatriation (922) 31 YALE LAw Jo=URAL, 848,
866.
CAmRRIEs-CoNTRAcr OF HIRE CONSTITUTING COMMON CARuR.-By statute,
motor vehicles used in the public transportation of passengers for hire over
state roads were declared to be common carriera and the owners of such vehi-
cles were required to secure a permit from the Public Service Commission. 4
Md. Ann. Code, 1918, sec. i89, art. 56; Md. Laws, i92o, ch. 677, sec. I. A hired
his truck to B, agreeing to transport twice daily between two designated points
such persons as B desired, A to furnish a driver at his own expense. B agreed
to pay A a stipulated sum for each trip and an additional amount for every
passenger beyond a fixed number. No permit was obtained. The Public Service
Commission sought to enjoin A and B from so operating the truck. Held, that
the injunction should issue since A and B were common carriers. Goldsworthy
v. Maloy (1922, Md.) Iig Atl. 693.
To enable the state more effectively to exercise control the legislature has
denominated certain instrumentalities of commerce and travel common car-
riers. See Adler, Business Jurisprudence (914) 28 IARv. L. Rxv. 135. The
result involved in each individual case seems to have swayed the courts in classi-
fying a carrier as "common" or "private." A special contract of hire is merely
one circumstance to be considered in the classification. Campbell v. A. B. C.
Storage & Van Co. (I915) 187 Mo. App. 565, 174 S. W. 140 (lien claimed on
goods transported). So a ship chartered to transport a specific cargo has been
exempted from a common carrier's liability for goods damaged. The Dan (i889,
S. D. N. Y.) 4o Fed. 691. A railroad hauling over its lines a special train of
circus cars may stipulate against liability for damages since it is not a common
carrier. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Wallace (i895, C. C. A. 7th) 66 Fed. 5o6.
A garagekeeper who furnishes automobiles on orders is not a common carrier
for purposes of regulation. Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Dist. of Col. (1916) 241
U. S. 252, 36 Sup. Ct. 583. Nor is he bound to a common carrier's standard of
care for the safety of passengers. Forbes v. Reinman & Wolfort (1914) 112
Ark. 417, i66 S. W. 563. But one who engages in renting his automobile at a
fixed stand has been deemed a common carrier and hence subject to regulation.
Cushing v. White (i918) loi Wash. 172, 172 Pac. 229. A common carrier is not
divested of its character as such merely because it serves a particular or limited
group of customers. Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Dist. of Col., supra. So a rail-
road transporting miners to and from their work under a contract of hire with
their employer under an arrangement similar to that in the principal case was
held responsible as a common carrier for injuries received by a miner while so
riding. Vandalia Ry. v. Stevens (1917) 67 Ind. App. 238, 114 N. E. iooi. And
a jitney-line which had contracted with a municipality to carry passengers
between certain points was amenable to criminal prosecution for failure to obtain
a permit required of common carriers. State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus Co. (i916)
93 Wash. 614, 161 Pac. 467. In the instant case the court strongly suggested that
the contract contemplated the solicitation of business. But the result effectuates
the apparent intent of the legislature to subject such businesses to regulation.
There may, however, be some doubt whether the holding necessarily calls for the
imposition on the defendants of all the duties and liabilities of a common carrier.
But see Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Dist. of Col., supra; cf. Adler, op. cit. i44, 145.
CARRIERS-PROPRIETOR OF AMUSEMENT DxvcE NOT A COMMON CARRIER-DEGREE
OF CAR Rx QUED.-The plaintiff paid a fare to ride on the defendant's aeroplane
swing. The swing broke and the plaintiff was injured. In a suit for damages,
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the court charged that the defendant was required to exercise the highest degree
of care and skill which may reasonably be expected of persons engaged in that
business. Held, that since the defendant was not a common carrier, the charge
was error. Firszt v. Capitol Park Realty Co. (1923, Conn.) i2o At. 300.
Although the cases are in conflict, the weight of authority seems to be that the
proprietor of an amusement device is not a common carrier, and, therefore, he is
not held to the standard of the highest degree of care generally required of such
a carrier. So, the proprietor of an undulating floor known as an "ocean wave!'
has been held to the standard of only ordinary care. Carlin v. Krout (1923,
Md.) 12o Atl. 232; contra: Tenn. State Fair Ass'nt. v. Hartmnan (1916) 134
Tenn. 149, 183 S. W. 735. But the proprietor of a scenic railway has been con-
sidered a common carrier. O'Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co. (igog) 242 Ill.
336, 89 N. E. 1OO5; Best Park & Amusement Co. v. Rollins (x915) 192 Ala. 534,
68 So. 417; but see contra: Linsdean v. Thompson, Scenic Ry. Co. (1909) I3o
App. Div. 209, 114 N. Y. Supp. 421; Pointer v. Mountain Ry. Construction Co.
(1916) 269 Mo. io4, 189 S. W. 805; Linthicum v. Truitt (1911, Del.) 2 Boyce,
338, 8o Atl. 245 (merry-go-round); Meisner v. Detroit Ferry Co. (19o8) 154
Mich. 545, 118 N. W. 14; 26 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1054, note; Ann. Cas. 1I5B, 546,
note. The distinction, according to the principal case, is not in the nature of the
instrumentality but in the occasion for its use-transportation as distinguished
from amusement. But such a distinction is difficult of application to such cases
as the sight-seeing bus or the observation train at a boat race. See Hinds v.
Steere (1911) 209 Mass. 442, 95 N. E. 844. Historically the distinction may be
sound as the law of passenger carriers developed by analogy from the law of
carriers of goods where a "holding out" to the public was the test of its "com-
mon" character. Fish v. Chapman (1847) 2 Ga. 349; ef. Central Ry. v. Lippman
(19oo) no Ga. 665, 36 S. E. 202. On policy it seems desirable, however, to
require a high degree of care from the proprietor of a dangerous instrumentality.
The attempt to differentiate between those cases would have been unnecessary
had the courts not attempted to distinguish beween degrees of care. Such dis-
tinction has been often criticized. Steamboat New World v. King (853, U. S.)
16 How. 469, 474; Dickerson v. Conn. Co. (1922) 98 Conn. 87, ii8 Atl. S18;
but see Astin v. Chicago Ry. (igio) 143 Wis. 477, 128 N. W. 265; see (1922)
31 YA LA w JoURNAL, 555. A few courts have even held erroneous instruc-
tions which require of a common carrier the "highest degree of care." Union
Traction Co. v. Berry (igig) 188 Ind. 514, 121 N. E. 655; O'Brien v. New York
Rys. (1919) 185 App. Div. 867, 174 N. Y. Supp. 116; see Kelleher v. Atkinson
(1922) 201 App. Div. 876, 193 N. Y. Supp. 939; (i919) ig Co. L. REv. 166. It
seems that the rule of due care, or care proportioned to the danger, should apply
even to common carriers. The elusive nature of any distinctions between degrees
of care is indicated in the instant case, for the court says that the jury should be
instructed that as to the device in question ordinary care required more super-
vision of its use than in the case of a device with little or no danger.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-RcOGNITION OF DIVORcE GRANTED IN FOREIGN COUN-
TRy.-After marriage the plaintiff and the defendant became domiciled in New
York. Subsequently they resided in France for several years, but retained their
original domicile. The defendant procured a divorce in a French court on the
ground of adultery, the plaintiff in the same action asking for affirmative relief.
Later the plaintiff brought this suit for divorce. Held, that the French decree
was a bar to the action. Gould v. Gould (1923, N. Y.) 138 N. E. 490.
A divorce granted by one state having jurisdiction is binding upon a sister
state by virtue of the full faith and credit clause. Haddock v. Haddock (19o6)
201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct 525; Thompson v. Thompson (1913) 226 U. S. 55I,
33 Sup. Ct. 129; see COMMENTS (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 319. But the
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validity of such a decree by the court of a foreign nation is to be decided by each
state for itself upon principles of comity. Minor, Conflict of Laws (igoI) sec.
4. However, divorces granted in the country in which both parties were domi-
ciled are universally recognized. Kapigan v. Der Minassin (1912) 212 Mass. 412,
99 N. E. 264 (Mohammedan); Miller v. Miller (igi, Sup. Ct.) 7o Misc. 368,
128 N. Y. Supp. 787 (rabbinical) ; Wall v. Williamson (1845) 8 Ala. 48 (Indian
tribal). In Anglo-American law, jurisdiction over the res, the marital status,
depends upon domicile. Minor, op. cit. sec. 88. And, as a rule, the domicile of
either spouse has sufficient jurisdiction for a decree of its courts to be recog-
nized in other countries. Cheever v. Wilson (1869, U. S.) 9 Wall. io8; Lie v.
Lie (igi6, Sup. Ct.) 96 Misc. 3, I59 N. Y. Supp. 748. But a dissolution of mar-
riage in a nation where neither spouse is domiciled is not accorded extra-terri-
torial validity. Sure v. Lindefelt (1892) 82 Wis. 346, 52 N. W. 308. And the
consent of the parties in submitting to a foreign court is held not to give juris-
diction over their status. Andrews v. Andrews (1903) 188 U. S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct.
237. The party invoking a foreign jurisdiction, however, may be personally
estopped to deny its competency. Starbuck v. Starbuck (19o3) 173 N. Y. 503, 66
N. E. 193. But the decree may usually be attacked by third parties. Andrews
v. Andrews, supra (second wife) ; German Savings and Loan Society v. Do-
mitzer (i9o4) 192 U. S. 125, 24 Sup. Ct. 221 (heirs); see CoMrNTs (i9i)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 821. In view of the absence of domicile the liberal
recognition of the foreign divorce decree by the court in the instant case may
be supported on the ground of estoppel. Furthermore it seems desirable for the
forum to concede its sovereignty when its own laws are not eluded or its local
policy offended.
CONTEMPT-CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEmPT-CLAYTON ACT PRovIsION FOR JURY
TRi.-The defendants, members of an organization enjoined from committing
certain acts, were ordered to show cause in contempt proceedings for violation
of the injunction. The defendants denied the alleged acts and demanded a jury
trial, under sections 21 and 22 of the Clayton Act. Act of Oct. 15, 1914 (38
Stat at L. 730, 738). Held, that even if the Act applied to the facts in this case,
the jury trial provision was unconstitutional. In re Atchison (1922, S. D. Fla.)
284 Fed. 604.
Acts in derogation of the authority of a court, resulting in punitive proceed-
ings, constitute criminal contempts; those resulting in proceedings to right civil
wrongs constitute civil contempt. Gompers v. Buck Stove & R. Co. (1911) 221
U. S. 418, 441, 31 Sup. Ct 492, 498. Procedural differences and a lack of power
in executive departments to pardon for civil contempt make this classification
important. Beale, Contempt of Court, Crminal and Civil (198o) 21 HARv. L.
REV. 16i; NOTES (1912) 25 ibid. 375; NOTES (92) 5 MlINNQ. L. REv. 459; (1923)
36 HARv. L. REV. 617 (pardoning power). Direct contempts necessitate the use
of summary proceedings; statutory provisions for jury trial where they exist at
all in this relation deal oily with constructive contempts. I Ga. Code, 1911,
1o95, io96; I Bunn's Okla. Comp. Sts. 1921, 121 (constitutional provision) ; see
Cheney, Jury Trials in Contempt Cases (1914) 78 CENT. L. JouR. 183; see Beale,
op. cit. 172, 173. The power to punish for contempt is less subject to interfer-
ence by legislatures in the case of courts created by a constitution than in courts
of legislative creation. Cf. Ex Parte Robinson (1873, U. S.) i Wall. 505, 510;
Rapalje, Contempts (1884) 12; 16 Ann. Cas. 759, note. Legislative attempts to
provide for jury trials of persons accused of contempt in constitutionally created
courts have been held invalid. Carter's Case (1899) 96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 78o;
Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney (192o) 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. E. 429; see NoTEs
and COMMzENT (1921) 6 CoRN. L. QUART. 329. A jury trial of a contempt charge
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has been granted under sections 21 and 22 of the Clayton Act, supra. Tosh v.
West Kentucky Coal Co. (1918, C. C. A. 6th) 252 Fed. 44, 45. Some equity
courts have referred the determination of facts in indirect contempt proceedings
to masters. Merchants' S. & G. Co. v. Board of Trade of Chicago (1912, C. C.
A. 8th) 2oI Fed. 2o, 29; Huttig Sash & Door Co. v. Fuelle (I9o6, E. D. Mo.)
143 Fed. 363, 375; Seastream v. N. I. Exhibition Co. (i9o7) 72 N. J. Eq. 377,
65 Ati. 982. For discussions of related matters, see 38 Ann. Cas. 1048, note
(contempt procedure in federal courts) ; 8 A. L. R. I543, note (location of con-
tempt power). Power to punish for contempt is an inherent judicial function.
It seems better policy to construe constitutions liberally, and allow legislation
providing jury trials in proceedings for criminal constructive contempt of court.
See also Novms (1923) 23 COL. L. Rav. 375.
CONTRACTS-IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE DUE To FOREIGN LA--QuAsI-
CONTRACTUAL REcovERY.-The plaintiff deposited dollars with the defendant
bank which agreed to open an account in roubles in the plaintiff's name in the
defendant's branch bank in Russia. A small part of this account was so paid to
the plaintiff. Later all Russian bank funds were confiscated by the Soviet
Government. The plaintiff sued to recover the balance of his deposit. Held,
that the plaintiff could not recover. Sokoloff v. National City Bank of Newv
York (1923, Sup. Ct.) 120 Misc. 252.
The rule that subsequent impossibility of performance does not excuse the
promisor from the duty to perform, has gradually given way before judicial
implications of conditions to excuse performance where impossibility intervenes.
Paradine v. Jane (1647, K. B.) Aleyn, 26; see Baily v. De Crespignty (1869))
L. R. 4 Q. B. i8o; Taylor v. Caldwell (1863, Q. B.) 3 Best & Smith, 826; (1918)
27 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 953; Anson, Contracts (Corbin's ed. I919) sec. 376. The
modern tendency is to excuse the defendant even in situations where perform-
ance by him is not, in fact, impossible, but where the condition or state of things
which formed the basis of the contract has ceased to exiA. Horlock v. Beal
[1916, H. L.] I A. C. 486; The Kronprinzessin Cecilie (1917) 244 U. S. 12, 37
Sup. Ct. 49o; Columbus Trust Co. v. Moshier (i9o6, Sup. Ct) 5I Misc. 27o;
aff'd. 193 N. Y. 66o, 87 N. E. 1117; (1922) 1o CALIF. L. REV. 337; (1918) 31
HARv. L. Rxv. 640; 3 A. L. R. 21, note; L. R. A. 19i6F, io, note. The same
rule has often, and correctly, been applied, although by a minority of the courts,
where the impossibility is due to foreign law. See Ford v. Cotesworth (187o,
Exch. Ch.) L. R. 5 Q. B. 544; Cunningham v. Dunn (1878, C. A.) L. R. 3 C. P.
Div. 443; Anson, op. cit. sec. 378; contra: Tweedic v. McDonald Co. (1902, S. D.
N. Y.) 114 Fed. 985. It seems in the instant case that the defendant's failure
to perform would not be an actionable breach; but this is no reason for allow-
ing him to enrich himself at the expense of the plaintiff. Keener, Quasi-Conr-
tracts (1893) 292. According to the weight of American authority, the defend-
ant must compensate the plaintiff for benefits received. Callahan v. Shotwell
(1876) 6o Mo. 398; Hudson v. Hudson (1891) 87. Ga. 678, 13 S. E. 583; Butter-
field v. Byron (i8gi) 153 Mass. 517, 27 N. E. 667; Dolan v. Rodgers (1896)
149 N. Y. 489, 44' N. E. 167; Jones v. Judd (1863) 4 N. Y. 411. The English
courts adopt a contrary view. Appleby v. Myers (1867) L. R. 2 C. P. 651.
While the plaintiff would normally sue to recover the sum he has paid under the
contract, yet where the defendant, according to the intention of the parties,
converted that payment into foreign currency of speculative value, with the
understanding that the loss or profit arising from the change of value should
go to the plaintiff, it seems proper to allow him to recover the value of his
right at the time of impossibility. See Woodward, Quasi-Contracts (1913) sec.
125; cf. (1922) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 418; 32 ibid. 179.
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PARTNERSHIP--INTEREST OF PARTNER IN SPECIFIC Fn~m REAL ESTATE-A part-
nership purchased real estate for resale, taking the conveyance in the individual
names of the two partners. On the decease of one of the partners the survivor,
having contracted to sell the property in administering the firm business, brought
a bill in equity to test whether the heirs of the deceased had an interest in the
specific property that had been purchased. Held, that under the Uniform Part-
nership Act, sec. 26, the heirs had no interest in the specific property, but only
the deceased's interest in the partnership, which was personalty. Wharf v.
Wharf (i922, Il) 137 N. E. 446.
Partners may own real estate in their partnership right, even though the deed
to the property is in their individual names. McKleroy v. Musgrove (I919) 203
Ala. 603, 84 So. 280; Burdick, Partiership (i9g7) ior. There is a conflict, how-
ever, as to whether a partner's interest in firm real estate is specific and subject
to the law of real property. In the case of personal property, the partner's inter-
est is undivided and relates to the partnership assets as a whole. Tensen v.
Wiersma (i919) 185 Iowa, 551, i7o N. W. 780; see 4 A. L. R. 3oo, note. The
English courts have long held to the same rule in regard to partnership real
estate, treating such property as equitably converted into personalty and so
entirely merged into the partnership fund. Darby v. Darby (1856, Ch.) 3
Drewry, 495. This result is now statutory. (189o) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, sec. 22.
By the majority American rule, in the absence of governing stipulations between
the parties, partnership real estate is treated as personalty only to the extent that
it is needed to pay partnership debts. Priestley v. Treas. and Receiver General(i918) 230 Mass. 452, 120 N. E. 100; 37 L. R. A. (x. s.) 90, note. So the
widow of a deceased partner is entitled to dower in that part of the real estate
not needed to pay such debts. Woodward-Holmes Co. v. Nudd (894) 58 Minn.
236, 59 N. W. Ioio; 27 L. R. A. 34o, note. Ard where the personal property is
sufficient to pay firm debts, the interest of the deceased partner in the specific
realty passes directly to his heirs according to the laws of real estate succession.
Weitz v. Weitz (i92i) i5 Ohio App. 134. But even by the American rule, real
estate purchased by a partnership for resale is treated as personalty between
the partners. Parish v. Bainum (1920) 291 Ill. 374, 126 N. E. 129 (dissolution
of partnership and distribution of assets); (i92o) i5 ILL. L. REV. 122. The
Uniform Partnership Act, adopted in 14 states, was intended to embody the
English rule under section 26. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act (915) 24
YALE LA w JoURNAL, 617, 637. The instant case, decided under this act, changes
the previous Illinois rule. Galbraith v. Tracy (894) 153 Ill. 54, 38 N. E. 937.
The result reached is desirable, inasmuch as it effects a simpler administration
of partnership assets by overcoming the practical difficulty of assigning specific
property to the individual partners or their heirs.
SALES-BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY-EFFECT OF PROVISION FOR RETURN.-
The plaintiff contracted to sell the defendant a quantity of silk thread. The
contract provided that all shipments should be tested by the buyer and returned
within fifteen days if unsatisfactory. The thread was on spools and the defects
were not discovered until it was unwound and made into fabric. In a suit for the
price, the buyer counterclaimed for damages. Held, (one judge dissenting) that
it was a question for the jury whether the parties intended by the contract to
negative the implied warranty under Personal Property Law (N. Y. Cons. Laws,
igo9, ch. 41 as amended by Laws, 191, ch. 571, sec. 96; Uniform Sales Act, sec.
"5). Wilbur-Dolson Silk Co., Inc. v. William Wallach Co., Inc. (1923, Sup. Ct.)
120 Misc. 340, 198 N. Y. Supp. 243.
The 'Seller's liability for the breach of an implied warranty of quality generally
survives acceptance, where the defects are latent and undiscoverable by inspec-
tion. Uniform Sales Act, sec. 49; Preist v. Last [19o3, C. A.] 2 K. B. 148;
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see Carleton v. Lombard, Ayres & Co. (I896) 149 N. Y. 137, 43 N. E. 422;
Williston, Sales (igog) secs. 232, 234. By the better view, these implied warran-
ties remain effective unless inconsistent with the warranties expressed in the
contract of sale. Hansnann v. Pollard (Igi) 113 Minn. 429, 129 N. W. 848;
Uniform Sales Act, sec. 15 (6). But at common law it is generally held that an
express warranty excludes an implied warranty of quality where both cover the
same or closely related subjects. Somerville v. Gullett Gin Co. (1917) 137
Tenn. 509, 194 S. W. 576; Monroe v. Hickox Co. (I9o6) I44 Mich. 30, io7 N. W.
7IO; but see Mich. Comp. Laws, 1915, ch. 228 (Sales Act), sec. 15 (6). Many
courts extend this rule, and hold that an express warranty of quality excludes
any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness. DeWitt v. Berry (I8go) 134
U. S. 3o6, io Sup. Ct. 536; but see Guhy v. Nichols & Shepherd Co. (I9O8) 33
Ky. L. Rep. 237, 109 S. W. 1190 (express warranty held to exclude all implied
warranties). The parties may clearly nullify any or all implied warranties by
express provisions in the contract. Burntisland Shipbuilding Co. v. Barde Steel
Products Corporation (1922, D. Del.) 278 Fed. 552; Uniform Sales Act, sec. 71;
Sale of Goods Act (1894) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, sec. 55. But even in such a
case it has been held that the buyer may recover for non-compliance with descrip-
tion where the defects are not discoverable by inspection. Wallis v. Pratt [igi1,
H. L.] A. C. 394; contra: Leonard Seed Co. v. Crary Canning Co. (1911) 147
Wis. 166, 132 N. W. 902; 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 79, note; Kibbe v. Woodruff (i92o)
94 Conn. 443, io9 Atl. 169. The same rule is applicable where the contract by
its terms limits the remedies of the buyer to a return of the goods. Elgin
Jewelry Co. v. Estes and Dozier (i9o5) I22 Ga. 8o7, 50 S. E. 939; Main v.
Dearing and Wallace (19o5) 73 Ark. 470, 84 S. W. 64o. The reasoning is that
the effectiveness of the limitation is itself conditional on compliance with the
description. Cf. (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 739. It often seems desirable,
however, to consider the intention of the parties as a question of fact rather
than to construe the contract by applying fixed rules of law. Pennsylvania has
enacted the rule of the instant case in interpreting all contracts of sale purporting
to vary or negative implied obligations. Uniform Sales Act, sec. 71, as modified
by Pa. Laws, 1915, No. 241, sec. 71.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANE-PAROL CONTRACT VITHIN STATUTE OF FRAuDS-
POSSESSION AS SUFFICIENT PART PERFORMaANcE.-In the ejectment action the
defendant counterclaimed for specific performance of the oral contract of pur-
chase under which she had taken possession of the premises and occupied with-
out payment of rent for two years. Held, that the defendant could have specific
performance. Bradley v. Loveday (1922) 98 Conn. 315, iig At. 147.
The English doctrine that possession alone is sufficient part performance to
take an oral contract out of the Statute of Frauds has some- standing in America
by reason of numerous dicta accepted by commentators. Butcher v. Stapely
(1685, Ch.) I Vern. 363; Wharton v. Stoutenburgh (1882) 35 N. J. Eq. 266;
Eaton v. Whitaker (1846) IS Conn. 222; I Ames, Cases in Equity Jurisdiction
(19o4) 279, note I; Pomeroy, Specific Performance (2d ed. 1897) sec. 96;
(192o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 462. In some states, it has been expressly
repudiated. Baldridge v. Centgraf (1910) 82 Kan. 240, io8 Pac. 83; Glass v.
Hulbert (1869) 102 Mass. 24- Whether possession alone is a sufficient part
performance seems to depend on the theory upon which the court bases its
willingness to act. Some courts enforce the parol agreement where it would
be a "virtual fraud" on the vendee to permit the vendor to set up the Statute
of Frauds after he had allowed acts to be done in reliance on the contract.
Pomeroy, op. cit. sec. 1O4; Miller v. Ball (1876) 64 N. Y. 286; COMMENTS
(1915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 426. Under this theory it seems that possession
alone would not put the vendee in a position of material hardship. See Glad-
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yille v. McDole (191) 247 Ill. 34, 41, 93 N. E. 86, 88. Other courts grant specific
performance to protect the vendee from an action for trespass. Clinan v.
Cooke (18o2, Ch.) i Sch. & Lef. 22; Ham v. Goodrich (1856) 33 N. H. 32. But
one in possession without doing other acts may be fully protected in this respect
by showing the parol agreement as a license. Ann Berta Lodge v. Leverton
(1875) 42 Tex. 18; (192o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 462. A third theory is that
equity acts only to prevent "irreparable injury." Burns v. Daggett (1886) 141
Mass. 368, 6 N. E. 727; Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Steinman (1914, C. C. A. 4th)
217 Fed. 875; NoTEs (1904) 18 HAgv. L. REv. 137. The courts under this theory
seem to require in addition to possession permanent improvements of such a
nature that specific performance alone would be adequate redress. Cobb v.
Johnson (19o8) ioi Tex. 44o, io8 S. W. 811. The instant case seems to follow
the theory that acts unequivocally referring to some contract are a substituted
evidence for the required writing. Morphett v. Jones. (1818, Ch.) I Swanst.
172; Eaton v. Whitaker, supra; cf. Dickinson v. Barrow [19o4] 2 Ch. 339.
Here the suggestive act is said to be possession, but the fact that the possession
was undisturbed for a considerable time weakens the force of the assertion that
possession alone is enough. The theory of the case may be criticised as a con-
travention of the Statute of Frauds. It seems that equity should disregard the
statute only when the decree of specific performance will be the only means of
preventing irreparable injury. Cf. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Steinman, supra.
TAXATION-CoNTINGENT REMAINDERs.-The testator devised property to trus-
tees in trust for his son and daughter for life, with general powers of appoint-
ment of the remainder. The trustees appealed from an order of the surrogate
that, subject to any refund eventually necessary, the remainder was presently
taxable upon the death of the testator, at the rate applicable to devisees unrelated
to the testator. Held, that the assessment was proper. Matter of Cole (923)
235 N. Y. 48, 138 N. E. 733.
Some states under their statutes do not levy taxes on contingent estates until
the remainderman comes into possession. McLemore v. Raine's Estate (1915)
131 Tenn. 637, 176 S. W. iog; Moors v. Treasurer (1921) 237 Mass. 254, 129
N. E. 364; State v. Probate Court (19o7) IOO Minn. 192, i1O N. W. 865. This
is the construction given the federal act taxing beneficial interests in land. Act
of June 13, 1898 (30 Stat. at L. ch. 448, sec. 29) ; Kahn v. United States (1921)
257 U. S. 244, 42 Sup. Ct. 85. In New Jersey, this construction is, by statuute,
applied to powers of appointment. Security Trust Co. v. Edwards (1917) 9o
N. J. L. 579, ioi Atl. 383. In some states the demand for thd tax is postponed
until the remainderman comes into possession but it may be paid at any prior
time, and at a rate applicable when payment is made. Estate of De Borbon
(19o5) 211 Pa. 623, 61 Atl. 244; see McLemore v. Raine's Estate, supra, In
Wisconsin the tax becomes a lien at the time of the owner's death but payment
is postponed until the estate becomes vested, at which time the property is valued.
See State v. Pabst (i9og) 139 Wis. 561, 121 N. W. 351. But in Minnesota, the
tax is always computed upon the value at the time of the owner's death. State
v. Probate Court (191o) 112 Minn. 279, 128 N. W. 18. The statute in Illinois,
like that in New York, makes the estate presently taxable at the highest rate at
which, on the happening of any of the contingencies, it might be taxed. People
v. Starring (1916) 274 Ill. 289, 113 N. E. 627. Under this rule as applied in the
instant case full protection is given the state, at the expense of tying up the
ultimate settlement of the estate until the happening of the contingency. Warren,
The Progress of the Law (192o) 33 HARV. L. REV. 556, 572; but see In re Pratt's
Estate (1921) 6o Mont. 526, 199 Pac. 711. See also Gleason and Otis, Inheritance
Taxation (3d ed. 1922) 261; Ross, Inheritance Taxation (1912) 126.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENCY OF CHILDREN AFTER Divo CE
DEcRE-In a decree of divorce awarding custody to the mother, the father was
ordered to pay three dollars a week for the support of the child. Subsequently
the father was accidentally killed and the child brought action under the Work-
men's Compensation Act, which provided that children under the age of sixteen
years "shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent. . . upon a parent
who was at the time of his death legally bound to support although living apart
from such child or children." Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 152, sec. 32. Held,
that this conclusive presumption of dependency did not apply to a child whose
custody had been taken away from the deceased by a divorce decree. Miller's
Case (1923, Mass.) 138 N. E. 254.
Actual dependency of a child upon a parent will support a claim under work-
men's compensation acts. Johnson Coffee Co. v. McDonald (192o) 143 Tenn.
505, 226 S. W. 215; Harper, The Law of Workmen's Compensation (2d ed.
i92o) sec. 138. The acts often provide for "conclusive presumptions" of depend-
ency. Ninneman v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin (1920) 171 Wis. 190,
176 N. W. go9; Pacific Gold Dredging Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission
(1920) 184 Calif. 462, 194 Pac. i; Conn. Pub. Acts, 1921, ch. 305, sec. 5. So
under some statutes where the child is under a certain age. Johnson Coffee Co.
v. McDonald, supra; Tenn. Pub. Acts, 1919, ch. 123, sec. 30. In others where
a child under a certain age is living with its parent. Me. Laws, 1919, ch. 238,
sec. i; Mich. Comp. Laws, 1922, sec. 5436; R. I. Acts, 1912, ch. 831, art. II,
sec. 7. Several statutes, as in the instant case, also provide for such a "conclu-
sive presumption" if the parent was legally bound to support the child. Stephens
v. Stephens (1921, Ind. App.) 132 N. E. 747 ("upon whom the laws of the state
impose the obligation to support") ; Sherer & Co. v. Industrial Accident Com-
mission (1920) 182 Calif. 488, 188 Pac. 798 ("legally liable" for maintenance);
Calif. Gen. Laws, 1915, act 2144 a, sec. 19; Harper, op. cit. sec. 129. The
expression "duty to support ' is used in connection with children in a variety of
different senses. COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAv JOURNAL, 825. "Duty to
support" in the sense of duty to pay for necessaries furnished the child by third
parties has been held in Massachusetts to depend upon the right to custody.
Brow v. Brightman (1883) 136 Mass. 187. From this the court reasons that
there is no duty of support and therefore no "conclusive presumption" of
dependency in the instant case. But in this same sense there is no "duty of
support" where the father is actually supporting the child, although dependency
in such a case is obvious. 4 Ann. Cas. 1188, 1189, note; see Lufkin v. Harvey
(1915) 131 Minn. 238, 239, 154 N. W. 1O97. It seems that the divorce decree in
the instant case created a clear "duty to support." The decision may be justified,
however, on the ground that the child does not come within the "conclusive
presumption" of total dependency, since the award itself was admittedly insuffi-
cient for complete support. See Sherer & Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
supra, at p. 4.9o, 188 Pac. at p. 799. Viewed in any other light the decision is at
variance with the clear policy of the Act. See Schouler, Domestic Relations (6th
ed. 1921) sec. 796; Winner v. Shucart (1919) 202 Mo. App. 176, 215 S. W. 905
(recovery by mother for child's support though father had no custody) ; Panther
Creek Mines v. Industrial Commission (1921) 296 Ill. 565, 13o N. E. 321 (same
under Workmen's Compensation Act); Industrial Commission v. Drake (1921,
Ohio) 134 N. E. 465 (same) ; Sherer & Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,
supra (same); Western & A. Ry. v. Williams (1918) 22 Ga. App. 192, 95 S. E.
738 (father under duty to support after a divorce decree) ; Continental Casualty
Co. v. Pillsbury (1919) 181 Calif. 389, 184 Pac. 658 (a legal duty of support
after a decree of maintenance).
